Question One. Whether the Divine Persons are Equal in Magnitude

1. About the nineteenth distinction I ask first whether the persons are equal in magnitude.

That they are not:

Because in the Categories 6.6a26-27 is said that “it is proper to quantity that according to it a thing is said to be equal or unequal;” but quantity is not in God, according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.1 n.2, “God is great without quantity, good without quality;”     therefore etc     .

2. Again, nothing is to be posited in God which asserts imperfection. Equality is of this sort, - the proof is that it is repugnant to perfection in creatures; the thing is plain from Augustine 83 Questions q.41: “If all things were equal,” he says, “they would not now be ‘all things’;” therefore the perfection of the universe could not stand along with equality; equality, therefore, is not in everything better than its opposite, therefore it is not a perfection simply [I d.8 nn.22, 185]. Therefore it should not be posited in God as an essential feature or as common to the three persons.

3. Again, perfect equality is mutual; this [sc. equality in God] is not mutual, according to Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.10 n.11: “An image, if it is perfect, is coequal with what it is the image of, but not the latter with the image.”

4. The opposite is found in the Creed of Athanasius: “The persons are coeternal with each other and coequal,” - and the Master in the text gives a special proof of this from Augustine [rather Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter ch.1 n.4.

I. To the Question

5. Here one must look first at equality properly taken, second at equality taken generally, and third at how there is equality in the proposed case [sc. the divine persons], and fourth one must show that in this way [sc. of taking equality] there is perfect equality in the divine persons.

A. About Equality Taken Properly

6. On the first point the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5.15.1021a8-12 ‘On Relation’, distinguishes three relations founded on unity or ‘one’, namely the same, the like, and the equal - and speaking of these strictly and properly he appropriates them to three categories, as identity to substance, equality to quantity, and likeness to quality. And thus perhaps other relations can be founded on the principles of other categories, as proportionality on relation, - and this is what Avicenna seems to say [Metaphysics III ch.10 83rb], at least about the three common relations that the Philosopher expressly posits.

7. However, I say that the remote foundation of these relations is the thing in the category, as that the foundation of equality is the thing in the category of quantity, and of likeness the thing in the category of quality, and of identity the thing in the category of substance; but the proximate foundation or the proximate idea of the foundation is the unity of such thing, because disparate and not common relations are founded on things in categories in the way those things are diverse.

B. On Equality Taken Generally

8. On the second point [n.5] I say that any being in itself is a ‘what’, and has in itself some determinate degree among beings, and is a form or has a form; and accordingly, just as any being can be considered in these three ways, so also there can be founded on it a triple relation taken commonly; because identity [and diversity] are founded on any being insofar as it is a ‘what’, equality and inequality are founded on any being insofar as it has some magnitude of perfection (which is called ‘quantity of virtue’, about which Augustine says in On the Trinity VI ch.8 n.9 that “in things that are not great in bulk, to be better is the same as to be greater”), while likeness and unlikeness can be founded on any being insofar as it is ‘of a certain sort’ and is a certain quality (about this mode of quality the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 5.14.1020a33 ‘On Quality’, that “one mode of quality is difference in substance,” that is, substantial difference, and in this way individuals of the same species are essentially alike insofar as they have the same specific difference, which is as it were their essential quality).

9. In this way, namely taking the common relations and not the relations in the strict sense, the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 10.3.1054b25 that “any being compared with any being is the same or diverse;” so too any being compared with any being is equal or unequal. Just as then the foundation of identity, equality, and likeness - taken in this common way - is being in general compared with any being in general, so also the relations are transcendental along with being (though not convertible with it), but they are disjuncts and divide being, as being is divided into necessary and possible.

C. How there is Equality in the Proposed Case

10. On the third point [n.5] I say that just as no genus nor anything of any genus is said formally of God, so neither is a property of any genus so said of him, and consequently not any of the common relations either, in the way they are taken strictly, namely as they are properties of determinate genera or categories [n.6]; but because being is said formally of God, and any property convertible with being, and so always also the nobler extreme of non-convertible - but disjunct - properties, therefore in this way will that extreme be said of God that either asserts nobility or is not repugnant to nobility, while the other extreme is repugnant.

D. About Equality in the Divine Persons

11. On the fourth point [n.5] (setting aside for the present identity and likeness, which are not now in question [I d.31 q. un]), I say about equality that it exists perfectly in the divine persons.

12. And although equality in the case of some created beings can be taken according to quantity, whether continuous or discrete, and according to permanent and successive continuity, and although on this basis one could ask ‘whether there is in the divine persons equality in number’ (if perfect number were to exist there) and ‘whether there is perfect equality there in duration and according to eternity’ (which corresponds to successive quantity in creatures) - the first [sc. discrete quantity, or number], however, does not pertain to the present Distinction but to Distinction 24 (nor does the Master touch on anything about this here in the present Distinction, because he does not posit number here positively in the way perhaps it will be touched on in Distinction 24); but the Master does in a way touch on the second [sc. duration] (and he adduces Augustine [or rather Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter [n.4], and the thing was proved in Distinction 9 nn.6-11). The question is about the third [sc. continuous quantity], namely about equality in magnitude.

13. And that the equality is perfect is proved both from the remote foundation, namely magnitude, - and from the proximate idea of the foundation, namely unity [n.7].

The first proof is plain from the fact that magnitude of virtue is not perfect unless it is infinite; because infinity is not repugnant to it [sc. to magnitude of virtue], and nothing ‘which infinity is not repugnant to’ is perfect unless it is infinite; but every other magnitude of virtue is finite, and only it is infinite, as was made plain in I d.2 nn.131-136.

14. As to the second proof [n.13], the proposed conclusion is proved from the fact that in all other natural equalities the unity of the magnitude, in respect of which they are said to be equal, is diminished - because the magnitude in those equal things is separately counted; here however [sc. in the divine persons] there is perfect unity of magnitude and yet, along with it, a sufficient distinction between the related persons as is required for real relation.

15. But there is here a doubt because, since magnitude passes over into the essence, a relation founded on magnitude does not seem to be different from a relation founded on essence the way essence is a ‘what’, and so the equality does not seem to differ from the identity, - or if equality could be attended to in things that seem to be quasi-properties of the essence [sc. the attributes: power, wisdom, goodness     etc .], this is not attended to in them save insofar as they have magnitude of virtue; but this magnitude is not an attribute different from such perfection as asserts a mode intrinsic to the attribute (as was said often above [I d.8 nn.192, 220-221; d.10 n.30; d.13 nn.72, 80]); therefore      if likeness ‘in accord with such a property’ [sc. one or other attribute] is equality in the magnitude of the property, equality would not differ from likeness in the property - and thus it seems that equality insofar as it is equality should not here [sc. in the divine persons] be posited, because it exists neither as distinct from identity, speaking of the equality of essence, nor as distinct from likeness, speaking of the equality that is in magnitude of attributal perfections.

16. There is also another doubt because, if there can be infinite attributal perfections, infinite equalities of divine persons should be posited; for each perfection has its magnitude as a mode intrinsic to itself in accord with its own proper nature; therefore there will be as many magnitudes and equalities as there are attributal perfections.a

a [Interpolation] And further, since magnitude in divine reality is of itself of one idea, the consequence is that something of one idea in divine reality is not itself a this, and then the reason is not valid that was given above [Reportatio IA d.19 n.28] as to why there cannot be several supposits of the same idea in divine reality, namely that each of them is of itself a this and each production is of itself a this; but the opposite hereof seems to be true in the case of magnitude and equality in divine reality.

17. In response to these doubts.a To the first I reply - see the response etc. [I d.31 q. un. nn.6-7].

a [Interpolation] [I reply] that magnitude in divine reality does not state an attribute distinct from the others (as was said above about infinity [see reference in n.15 above]) but a degree that is intrinsic to any one of them, because there is no attribute in divine reality so simple that one may not ask about the quantity of its virtue; for if there were only one attribute in divine reality, as wisdom for example, it would still be possible to ask, as to its degree of virtue, how great it was; hence if each [sc. perfection simply, such as wisdom] existed without any other, each would still have a certain degree in its quantity of virtue, and each would be infinite and would have a magnitude formally infinite. And therefore magnitude is not in divine reality a single foundation merely of equality but is a single indifferent foundation, because it is preserved and included in every perfection simply, each of which perfections can be the foundation of equality, because each has its own magnitude; hence if in divine reality there are infinite ‘perfections simply’ there will also be infinite magnitudes, and likewise infinite equalities corresponding to them. But on the essence as it is a quiddity there is founded identity, - and as it asserts an infinite magnitude for the quantity of virtue, there is founded on it an equality between the persons that possess that essence. - But is equality distinguished in divine reality from likeness and identity? I reply that it both is so and is not so. For equality is not distinguished from likeness and identity as much as likeness and identity are distinguished from each other, because neither is its foundation (i.e. magnitude) distinguished from their foundations as much as their foundations are distinguished from each other, because magnitude - on which equality is founded - only asserts a mode or degree intrinsic to the foundations of identity and likeness, and is not distinguished from them formally as a ‘what’ or a ‘some sort of’ in the way they are distinguished form each other. Hence equality does not seem to assert in divine reality a different relation simply from likeness and identity, but it asserts only a perfect mode of each relation; a clarification can be given of the point: for if there are two white things one of which is whiter than the other, they are indeed alike although not equal - but they are not perfectly alike unless they be equal in whiteness, such that equality does not assert quasi-simply a relation other than their likeness, but asserts a perfection of likeness in each of the extremes and one that is in accord with a perfect mode of existence of the foundation in respect of which there is a likeness in each. So, if in the Father - according to the error of Arius - there were a greater deity and in the Son a lesser deity, the Son would indeed be like the Father; but he would not be equal with the Father because he would not have the form of deity as perfectly as the Father has it. Positing however - as we from the Faith posit - that nothing is less there in deity than anything else, the Son is perfectly alike, because they [sc. Father and Son] are altogether and perfectly equal in foundation of likeness. Hence, just as magnitude only states a perfect mode intrinsic to any essential perfection in divine reality, as with the essential perfections that are the foundations of identity and likeness, so equality states a perfect mode of these foundations and thus it does not state simply a relation different from them.

     To the second doubt [see the interpolation to n.16] one can reply in two ways. In one way as follows, that nothing of one idea can be multiplied unless it first require several things of another idea, through whose plurality the things of one idea are determined to their own plurality; but this does not hold of the divine persons, as is plain in the same place [Rep. IA d.19 n.29]; but in the proposed case equality requires a distinction of persons and of perfections simply, each of which has its own magnitude and all of them are distinct formally and in idea (the point is plain about justice and wisdom, which are of a different idea). One can say in another way, and equally well, that although unity goes along with the foundation of equality, yet it is not so remote a foundation of equality that by its diversity the equality is not multiplied, - which fact is plain in the relation of likeness: for just as knowledge is distinguished from charity, so is the likeness which is founded on unity in knowledge distinguished [sc. from the likeness which is founded on unity in charity]. But nevertheless one must say, as to the proposed case, that those equalities, founded on the magnitudes of diverse perfections, are not of the same idea formally, but of different ideas; and therefore, just as magnitude in wisdom is of a different idea from magnitude in goodness and the unity different from the unity, so the equality is of a different idea in the one case and in the other - and then one does not have to concede that something of the same idea is multiplied in divine reality.

II. To the Principal Arguments

18. To the first principal argument [n.1] I say that there is not there [sc. in divine reality] a quantity of bulk but of virtue; and if the name of quantity is made proper to magnitude of bulk (but if magnitude is not made proper to magnitude of bulk), then one could concede that there is magnitude there without quantity; and this magnitude is truly the foundation of transcendent equality, because every being is in this way great or small, and equal or unequal, although the magnitude is not a foundation of equality as equality is a property of quantity, which is a category.

19. But against this an argument is made that it does not seem anything can be said of God unless what belongs to the understanding of that thing is said of him; therefore, since quantity belongs to the understanding of magnitude, then magnitude cannot be conceded of God and quantity denied of him.

20. Again, when asking how great God is, one may well reply that he is immense; but if there is no quantity in God, no such question would arise.

21. Again, a property common to every being does not belong to any being by a specific difference; equality is a property common to every kind of quantity; therefore it does not belong to anything by any specific difference in the category of quantity, - and thus one cannot posit in God any difference in the category of quantity by saying that the category of quantity is not there but that there is there, by a difference in quantity, the idea of equality.

22. To the first [n.19] I reply that magnitude is equivocal according as it is a species of quantity distinct from multitude (Metaphysics 5.13.1020a7-10) and according as it is opposed to smallness and as its concrete from - that is, ‘great’ - is opposed to small (this distinction is sufficiently got from the Philosopher Metaphysics 10.6.1056b3-14 in the likeness ‘about long and short, great and small, many and one’). In the first sense magnitude is not applied to God, nor its difference as something belonging to him, as is plain from I d.8 nn.124, 136, because then the genus included in it would be applied to him; nor is magnitude in the second sense applied to him, in the way ‘great’ is taken properly and states a property of quantity, because a property proper to a thing does not exist without its proper subject. But magnitude taken in another sense is a property of being, and it is distinct from small, and in this way one or other extreme exists in every being; this is plain from the Philosopher in Metaphysics 5.13 1020a23-26, in the chapter on quantity: “But great and small, greater and smaller, are said absolutely and in relation to another; absolutely indeed they are properties of quantity; these names are also applied to other things” (as if he were to say: ‘properly taken’ they state properties of quantity, ‘commonly taken’ they state common properties of being).

23. As to the other [n.20] - how great God is - a rational question should be denied if quantity is denied of God; but if a rational question is conceded then a quantity of virtue should be conceded in God, not a quantity of bulk.

24. The third argument [n.21] only concludes that equality as it is a property in the category of quantity does not belong to God by any difference in the category of quantity, and that it is not applied to divine reality; and I concede that no difference in the category of quantity belongs to God; nor does any property in that genus belong to him, but a transcendent property does so belong.

25. To the next [sc. principal argument, n.2] I say that perfection simply, that is, a perfection that could formally be infinite, only asserts that in divine reality which can be essential to it and self-referred (and such is what is in some way pre-understood in the relations of origin), of which sort are wisdom and goodness     etc . But equality is not preunderstood in the relations of origin, nor can it be self-referred; for the Father is not equal to himself but to the Son, and therefore      equality in this way does not state a perfection simply; yet it does state a perfection which, in the case of every nature - when comparing it to something of the same nature -, is better than its opposite, because its opposite of necessity states imperfection; for no inequality in the same nature exists unless a second individual has the nature imperfectly. From the fact, then, that a relation can exist between supposits in that nature, an inequality of imperfection might exist in them because it might posit a diminished perfection in one of them; but equality of imperfection does not exist there, nay rather equality first requires perfection simply, because it first requires a nature that is perfect and that exists perfectly in each of the terms of the relation. And this is what Augustine says in his book On the Quantity of the Soul ch.9 n.15 when he speaks to the disciple: “Equality,” he says, “you rightly put before inequality, nor do I reckon there is anyone endowed with human sense to whom this would not be apparent.” This is indeed true, when making comparisons with things in the same nature; and things with which equality is compossible are simply more able to be perfect than things with which equality is not compossible, because in the latter case one or other of them is imperfect.

26. Next, as to the proof about perfection in creatures [n.2], - I reply that some things are necessary for perfection in creatures that do not state a perfection simply; and this is because creatures - being of themselves imperfect - cannot without these things have perfect perfection (as much perfection as they can have and of the sort they can have), and therefore these things in some way make up for the imperfection of creatures, as was said above in I d.7 n.64 where it was denied that the specific difference of anything was a perfection simply. Thus I say that limited perfection cannot be as great in one limited nature as it can be in several natures that are ordered; and so there an order of nature, that is an order of unequal perfection, is necessary for the greatest perfection they are capable of, - but it is not simply necessary for the greatest perfection, because that can exist in the most perfect unlimited nature, without an order of imperfection.

27. And if you argue that order belongs to perfection and that order seems to require inequality, - I make reply: I say that an order of origin stands along with perfection but that an order of inequality does not stand along with perfection. Therefore not every order belongs to perfection, but some order stands along with perfection in the same nature and some order does not.

28. To the third [principal argument, n.3] I say that sometimes equivalent opposite relations are founded on a common relation, just as if one were to speak of ‘the assimilating and the assimilated’. These state a relation of the active to the passive, founded on this common relation of ‘likeness’; for the assimilating is what causes likeness as the whiten-ing is what causes whiteness, and the assimilated is what is caused as to likeness just as the whitened is what is caused as to whiteness. There is here, then, a relation of active to passive in the assimilating and the assimilated, just as in the whitening and the whitened; but, in the case of the whiten-ing, that on which the relation of the active is founded is something absolute, but here - namely in the case of the assimilating - that on which the relation of the active is founded is the relation of equivalence. And such a name imports two relations of the following sort: one common and one of nonequivalence. As to the common relation, it exists in mutuality with the correlative of the relation; but it does not exist in mutuality with the correlative according to a relation of non-equivalence. - So also here, to be made co-equal imports the relation of the coequaled with the co-equaling, and so the equality is mutual; for the Son, who is made coequal with the Father, is equal with the Father and conversely. But the other relation, by way of what is passive, namely ‘to receive equality from another’, is not mutual but belongs precisely to the Son, and the opposite relation of non-equivalence - namely to make co-equal - belongs to the Father, that is ‘to give equality to the Son’. The image then [i.e. the Son] is equal, and conversely, but only the image is made co-equal in the sense of the two aforesaid relations.